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LABOR LAw-NLRB DEFERRAL TO ARBITRATION DECISIONS-Stephenson

v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is charged with administering the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).1 In
particular, one of the Board's duties is to ensure the legality and fairness
of arbitrated decisions. However, beginning with the Spielberg Manu-

facturing Co. 2 decision in the mid-1950s, the Board has developed a
policy favoring deference to arbitration decisions whenever such deference would not be repugnant to the purposes and policies of the NLRA.
The careful balance struck in Spielberg has been upset in recent years by
decisions which have, at least, eroded the Board's discretion to hear
various unfair labor practice issues, and which in some instances have
approached actual abdication of Board authority and responsibility. 3
The Ninth Circuit recently subjected this rapidly expanding deferral
policy to close scrutiny in Stephenson v. NLRB. 4 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that the Board had overstepped its powers by using liberalized
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970). The National Labor Relations Act § 10(a) is codified at
29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970) and provides in pertinent part: "The Board is empowered ... to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice ... affecting commerce.
This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has
been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise .....
See generally
Monsanto Chem. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1099, 47 L.R.R.M. 1451, 1452 (1961); Monsanto Chem. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 517, 520, 29 L.R.R.M. 1126, 1128 (1941), enforced, 205 F.2d
763 (8th Cir. 1953).
2. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955). Spielberg was actually an offspring of
an earlier deferral doctrine formulated in Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 18
L.R.R.M. 1370 (1946). See generally Radio Television Technical School, Inc. v. NLRB,
488 F.2d 457, 461 (3d Cir. 1973); Comment, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77
YALE L.J. 1191, 1192 (1968). The term "arbitration" for the purposes of this note will
denote voluntary grievance arbitration. Prior to the 1940s, arbitration was rarely used to
settle grievance disputes. Today, it is used in nearly 95% of labor-management agreements
in the private sector. See generally Cohen & Eaby, The Gardner-DenverDecision and
Labor Arbitration, 27 LAB. L.J. 18 (1976).
3. See, e.g., T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc. v. NLRB, 504 F.2d 294, 302 (5th Cir. 1974); Fikse
Bros. (Stephenson), 220 N.L.R.B. 1301, 1301-02, 90 L.R.R.M. 1354, 1355-56 (1975)
(Member Fanning, dissenting); National Tea Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 614, 615, 80 L.R.R.M.
1736, 1738 (1972). The use of the term "abdication" is not intended as a personal attack
upon the Board members. Rather, it is used to highlight the use and misuse of powers
given to the Board through many generations of Board members. See also Belkin, Are
Arbitrators Qualified to Decide Unfair Labor PracticeCases?, 24 LAB. L.J. 818, 819-20
(1973).
4. 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977) (Senior Circuit Judge Barnes and Judge Ely for the
majority; Judge Kunzig, by designation, dissenting).
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tests for deferral which were never envisaged in the original Spielberg
doctrine, and which were not sustainable in light of the mandate given to
the Board by Congress.5 Stephenson represents a classic example of the
refusal of reviewing courts to allow an administrative board to relinquish
its power to private means of resolution, especially when, as here, the
purpose was to serve the public sector's needs through a
Board's express
6
forum.
public
II.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Arthur Stephenson entered the employ of respondent Fikse Brothers on
July 5, 1973, as a diesel repair mechanic at $3.50 per hour. The shop was
covered by a union contract which set forth wage rates for union mem-7
bers, but there was no requirement that Stephenson join the union.
Initially Stephenson chose not to join the union, and even though he was
paid at a lower $3.50 wage rate, he received benefits and privileges not
available to the union members. 8 Late in 1973 Stephenson joined the
union. At that point his relations with management turned sour, the
benefits and privileges ceased, and Stephenson was discharged for incompetence for reasons that were later determined to be unjustified. 9
Stephenson instituted the required arbitration proceedings, 10 and although he prevailed therein, he was dissatisfied with the actual sum
awarded to him."I Stephenson then brought his claim before an administrative law judge 2 who affirmed the award rendered in the arbitration
5. The most liberal of these tests is enunicated in Electronic Reproduction Serv.

Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211 (1974), overruled in Stephenson v. NLRB,
550 F.2d 535, 541 (9th Cir. 1977), and discussed at notes 71-89 infra and accompanying
text.
6. See generally National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 362-63 (1940); Banyard
v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Shoreline Enterprises of America, Inc. v.
NLRB, 262 F.2d 933, 944 (5th Cir. 1959); Tyee Constr. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 307, 310, 82
L.R.R.M. 1548, 1552 (1973) (Members Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting).
7. Fikse Bros., 220 N.L.R.B. 1301, 1302-03, 90 L.R.R.M. 1354, 1355 (1975).

8. These benefits included the right to drink coffee at work, the free use of shop
coveralls, as well as other privileges. Id. at 1302, 90 L.R.R.M. at 1355.
9. Id. at 1302, 90 L.R.R.M. at 1356. The true reason appears to have been related to
Stephenson's increased interest and involvement with union activities. Respondent Fikse
Bros., however, contended that Stephenson was discharged for smoking near containers
of flammable solvent after numerous warnings regarding such practices.
10. Id. at 1304, 90 L.R.R.M. at 1354-55. Stephenson's employment contract contained
a mandatory grievance-arbitration clause. Under the Collyer doctrine (discussed at text
accompanying notes 49-55 infra) the parties would normally be required to exhaust their
contractual remedies prior to seeking Board review.
I1. Stephenson was seeking the difference in wages paid and what he claimed was
owed to him since he was hired ($1,800). He was awarded $250 in the arbitration decision.
Id. at 1304, 90 L.R.R.M. at 1354.
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
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decision. An appeal was taken to the NLRB, which in turn upheld the
decisions rendered below, based on the deferral practice established in

Spielberg and later broadened in Electronic Reproduction Service
Corp.13 Stephenson, pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act

(LMRA),' 4 invoked the reviewing power of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals which reversed the ruling of the administrative law judge and the
Board, and held that deferral was inappropriate in this instance. The

court held that only when it is clear that an arbitration panel is competent
to resolve the issues subject to deferral, and only when those issues are,

in fact, clearly decided, can deferral be properly exercised.15 With these
two additional requirements, the Ninth Circuit in Stephenson converted
the three-pronged deferral test of Spielberg into a more restrictive fivepronged test as originally formulated by the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals in Banyard v. NLRB.16
Ill.

STATUTORY BASIS FOR THE NLRB's DEFERRAL POLICY

Section 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act' 7 states that the
NLRB's power to remedy unfair labor practices "shall not be affected by
13. 213 N.L.R.B. 758, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211 (1974). Although claiming not to rely on the
discredited ElectronicReproduction decision as the administrative law judge had admittedly done, the dissent reasoned that the majority's decision perpetuated the rationale of
that now discredited case. Fikse Bros., 220 N.L.R.B. at 1301, 90 L.R.R.M. at 1355
(Member Fanning, dissenting). See also notes 71-89 infra and accompanying text.
14. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970), reading in part: "Any person aggrieved by a final order of
the Board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of
such order in any United States court of appeals .... " Ironically, since the Board's
policy on deferral was established, most cases have been subject to abstention and
deferral at the regional office level and have never reached the five-member Board,
making review by the court of appeals impossible. See Simon-Rose, Deferral Under
Collyer by the NLRB of Section 8(a)(3) Cases, 27 LAB. L.J. 201, 213 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Simon-Rose].
15. Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1977). Normally the findings of
the Board will not be disturbed if there is substantial evidence to support the findings. See,
e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951); NLRB v. International
Longshoremen's Local 27, 514 F.2d 481, 483 (9th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Northern Metal
Co., 440 F.2d 881, 885-86 (3d Cir. 1971).
16. 505 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The two new restrictions require that the arbitral
panel be competent to decide the issues in question, and that the arbitrator actually decide
those issues adjudged to be within the arbitrator's competence. These requirements are
merely added to, and do not replace, Spielberg's three-pronged test. Of the two additional
requirements, the "competency" criterion seems to have the rougher edges. As yet, no
definite rule to determine an arbitrator's competency has been devised. See notes 123-25
infra for a discussion of the issue of whether arbitrators are competent to decide statutory
issues at all.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970). See also Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S.
261, 271 (1964).
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any other means of adjustment . . . that has been or may be established
by agreement .
".8..
I' The Board has held that it is not bound by an
arbitration award 9 and can fashion its own remedies if such remedies are
appropriate in order to carry out the statutory mandate to correct unfair
labor practices."2 It has openly disregarded arbitration awards which are
at odds with the statute, or where the Board's integrity is challenged by
21
the complaint itself.
Nevertheless, courts have consistently held that it is within the Board's
discretionary power to defer to arbitration awards in appropriate situations.2 2 The concept of nearly automatic deference on contractual or
factual issues has never been a matter of conflict.23 Rather, it is in the
18. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970). See also National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 80
L.R.R.M. 1718 (1972) (Members Jenkins and Fanning, dissenting). The dissent quoted the
following language: "[Tihe Board may, in its discretion, defer its exercise of jurisdiction
over any such unfair labor practice in any case where there is another means of prevention
provided for by agreement . . . ." Id. at 535, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1726 (citing I NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr 1301 (1935) & II
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 2351 (1935)).

The dissent argued that the fact that this passage was struck from the final draft of the
NLRA provides proof of Congress' intent to reject expansive deferral policies. Cf.
Johannesen & Smith, Collyer: Open Sesame to Deferral, 23 LAB. L.J, 723, 738 (1972)
("The Board cannot substitute its judgment for that of the parties concerning which
process-statutory or contractual-to use in the settlement of contract disputes.").
19. Hawaiian Hauling Serv., Ltd. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 674, 675 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 2921 (1977).
20. NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Local 27, 514 F.2d 481,483 (9th Cir. 1975).
Accord, NLRB v. Walt Disney Prods., 146 F.2d 44, 48 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 877 (1946), in which the Ninth Circuit stated: "Clearly, agreements between private
parties cannot restrict the jurisdiction of the Board. . . . [W]e believe the Board may
exercise jurisdiction in any case of an unfair labor practice when in its discretion its
interference is necessary to protect the public rights defined in the Act." Id. (citations
omitted). But cf. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793,798 (1945) (interpreting
§ 8 of the NLRA as designed "to avoid 'a rigid scheme of remedies' "). See also Radio
Television Technical School, Inc. v. NLRB, 488 F.2d 457 (3d Cir. 1973); National Tea
Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 614, 80 L.R.R.M. 1736 (1972).
21. See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261,272 (1964). Accord, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 50 n.13 (1974); Monsanto Chem. Co., 130
N.L.R.B. 1097, 1099, 47 L.R.R.M. 1451, 1452 (1961).
22. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964). The Supreme Court
reasoned in Carey that "the Board has considerable discretion to respect an arbitration
award and decline to exercise its authority over alleged labor practices if to do so will
serve the fundamental aims of the Act." Id. at 270-71. Accord, NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S.
357, 360-61 (1969); NLRB v. International Ass'n of Bridge Workers Local 378, 473 F.2d
816, 817 (9th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). Cf. Siegel, NLRB Deferralto Arbitration,26 N.Y.U.
CONF. ON LAB. 19, 22-23 (1974) (arguing that power to defer is within Board's ancillary
jurisdiction). See also 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970); Monsanto Chem. Co., 130 N.L.R.B.
1097, 1098-99, 47 L.R.R.M. 1451, 1452 (1961).
23. See Coulson, Title Seven Arbitration In Action, 27 LAB. L.J. 141, 143 (1976)
("[Clontractual language is recognized as the touchstone of the arbitrator's authority.").
But see NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421,429 (1967); National Radio Co., 198
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area of statutory construction, an area exclusively reserved for
the Board
24
by the NLRA, where there has been divergence of opinion.
The major stumbling block in establishing a workable deferral policy
appears to be in reconciling the competing congressional. policies between the independence of the Board and the favoring of arbitration as a
means of resolving labor disputes. 25 The former principle relates to the
notion that the NLRB is an independent and autonomous protector of
statutory rights in the realm of labor relations ;26 this doctrine requires free
access by individuals to the Board in order to vindicate statutory rights.2 7
On the other hand, of an equally compelling nature is the congressional
policy supporting the concept of deference to arbitration and giving "full
play" to that method of dispute resolution whenever possible. 28 The
Labor Management Relations Act states that arbitration enjoys a preferred position in labor law. 2 9 The Supreme Court has added the view
that arbitration has served the national interest by reducing industrial
N.L.R.B. 527, 533, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718, 1725 (1972) (Members Fanning and Jenkins,
dissenting).
24. The debate centers on whether Congress meant that statutory issues should be
exclusively decided de novo by the Board, or whether the Board members can act as a
reviewing body and delegate decisional power elsewhere. See NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S.
357, 361 (1969).
25. Lodges 700, 743, 1746, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 525 F.2d 237, 245 (2d
Cir. 1975); Local 2188, Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 1087, 1090
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974); Collyer Insulated Wire Co., 192 N.L.R.B.
837, 841, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1935 (1971). See also Simon-Rose, supra note 14, at 202,
stating that the problem resulted from the failure of Congress "to explain what impact, if
any, LMRA Section 203(d) would have on the Board's exclusive authority to administer
the NLRA pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Act."
26. The Board's statutory mandate is found in NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
See note I supra.
27. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 55 (1974). See also
NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 424-25 (1968) (stating that
"the overriding public interest makes unimpeded access to the Board the only healthy
alternative .... ").
28. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 381-82 (1974); Carey v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1964); Lodge 1327, Machinists Workers v. Fraser &
Johnson Co., 454 F.2d 88, 91 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 920 (1972). Full play is
given to arbitration agreements because of the extent of their use. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-1, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-

ING AGREEMENTS 1 (1964) (finding that approximately 94% of all collective bargaining agreements provide for arbitration of some or all contract disputes).
29. The Labor Management Relations Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970) states in
pertinent part: "[F]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to
be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement." See Gateway Coal Co. v.
UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974); Nabisco, Inc. v. NLRB, 479 F.2d 770,773 (2d Cir. 1973).
See also S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947), reprintedin I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 429 (1948).
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strife and by offering an alternative to economic coercion. 30 The legislative history of the 1947 amendments to the LMRA provides further
evidence of the congressional policy to encourage the voluntary settlement of contractual disputes through the machinery established by the
parties while in the process encouraging self-government in labor-management relations. 3 1 It is the delicate balance between these two competing policies that the Ninth Circuit in Stephenson seeks to preserve.

IV.

THE DEFERRAL DoCTRINE'S DEVELOPMENT IN CASE LAW

A.

The Ninth Circuit: Early Starter-LateBloomer

The Ninth Circuit is not a newcomer to the issue of when deferral to an
32
arbitration award is appropriate. In NLRB v. Walt Disney Productions
the Ninth Circuit made one of the earliest pronouncements on the wisdom
of the deferral doctrine in holding that the Board should not exercise its

deferral powers in an unfair labor practice case when in the Board's
opinion its "interference" is necessary to protect the public rights as
defined in the NLRA. 33 Until the mid-1970s, however, the Ninth Circuit
rarely dealt with the scope of the deferral doctrine, unlike the other
circuits and the Board. 34 Therefore, because much of the development of
the deferral doctrine has taken place outside the Ninth Circuit, an examination of those decisions is important to a proper understanding of the
Stephenson decision.35
B. Spielberg: The Cornerstone of Deferral
As suggested earlier, the policy of deferring to arbitration decisions
was carried on informally long before the Spielberg Manufacturing Co.
30. William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12,'18 (1974); Carey v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 454 (1957).
31. When reporting out its bill the senate committee commented:
[I]t is not intended that the National Labor Relations Board shall undertake to
adjudicate all disputes alleging breach of labor agreements. Any such course would be
inimical to the development by the parties themselves of adequate . . . voluntary
arbitration machinery. It is the purpose of this bill to encourage free-collective
bargaining; it would not be conducive to that objective if the Board became the forum
for trying day-to-day grievances ....
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 23 (1947).
32. 146 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 877 (1945).
33. Id. at 48. The court also stated: "The result is inevitable that the NLRB may
exercise its jurisdiction . . . and is in no way governed by the NWLB [National War
Labor Board] policy favoring arbitration." Id.
34. Although the Ninth Circuit had some opportunities to decide deferral questions in
the years between Disney and Stephenson, it chose not to set any new trends.
35. Certainly the Stephenson majority's reliance on the District of Columbia Circuit's
opinion in Banyard is reason enough to explore the deferral policies in other circuits and
of the various Board members. See note 91 infra and accompanying text.
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decision.3 6 In effect, the Board's decision in Spielberg brought the

deferral policy out into the open. The court formulated a three-pronged
test for proper deferral to arbitration: first, that the proceedings be fair

and regular in their award; second, that all parties have previously agreed
to be bound by the arbitration decision; and third, that the decision of the
arbitration panel not be clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of

the NLRA.37 The court's determination in Spielberg that deferral should
be allowed was made easier by the close relationship between factual and

statutory questions and by the fact that the issues had been clearly
decided in the earlier arbitration proceedings.38 The Board, at that time,
did not have to face the more difficult questions of whether deferral was
appropriate when the statutory and factual questions were not closely
related, or whether it3 9was appropriate when the issue was not clearly
decided in arbitration.
The Board's underlying policy considerations in Spielberg are based

on encouraging the voluntary resolution of labor disputes, allowing for
the final adjustment of a dispute by a method mutually agreed upon by
the parties, and preventing the expense and injustice which would result
were the respondent required to defend himself in two forums on the
same charge. 4' In addition, it was strongly argued in Spielberg that if the

Board would still give de novo consideration to an issue previously
36. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955). See Wertheimer Stores Corp., 107
N.L.R.B. 1434, 33 L.R.R.M. 1398 (1954); Monsanto Chem. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 517, 29
L.R.R.M. 1126 (1951), enforced, 205 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1953); Timken Roller Bearing Co.,
70"N.L.R.B. 500, 18 L.R.R.M. 1370 (1946), rev'd on othergrounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.
1947).
37. 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153. See also Electrical Workers Local 715
v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 1136, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co., 146
N.L.R.B. 1410, 1423, 56 L.R.R.M. 1321, 1325-26 (1964) (concurring opinion); Raytheon
Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 886, 52 L.R.R.M. 1129, 1131 (1963), set aside on othergrounds,
326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964); Comment, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 YALE
L.J. 1191, 1192 (1968).
38. See Simon-Rose, supra note 14, at 203.
39. See Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 539 n.7 (9th Cir. 1977) ("In Spielberg, the
Board's deference was reasonable as the unfair labor practice issue was so concomitant
with an issue involving contractual interpretation that the latter was dispositive of the
former."); Local 2188, Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 1087, 1091
(D.C. Cir. 1974). Cf. National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718 (1972),
overruled in General Am. Transp. Corp., 94 L.R.R.M. 1483 (1977) (the first case to deal
with a dispute that did not have intertwined statutory and contractual issues). For a
discussion of National Radio Co., see notes 63-70 infra.
40. Defending in two forums on the same charge is known as the "two bites of the
apple" or dual theory of litigation, explored more fully in notes 76-79 infra. This concept
is traceable to the early deferral doctrine decisions. See, e.g., Associated Press v. NLRB,
492 F.2d 662, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 501, 18
L.R.R.M. 1370, 1371 (1946).
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resolved by arbitration, little progress towards the peaceful resolution of
industrial disputes could be accomplished.4 1 Critics have pointed to
42
Spielberg as the first step towards abdication of the Board's authority.
Spielberg supporters cite the Board's tremendous caseload as reason
enough for liberal deferral policies;43 the third prong of the Spielberg test
(that the decision not be repugnant to the statute) appears, to Spielberg's
supporters, to be an adequate safeguard against abuse or abdication of
responsibility.'
Aside from those critics who shun all deferral policies as an abdication
of the Board's authority, the Spielberg doctrine has rarely been criticized
in its twenty-year tenure. 45 Rather, problems have resulted in the interpretation and modification of the basic Spielberg guidelines to areas

beyond the bounds originally contemplated in that decision.' 6 Stephenson similarly supports Spielberg's basic requirements, but requires a
more exacting standard in the areas of competency and clarity of the
arbitration panel's record before deferral can be considered properly
exercised.47
The Spielberg doctrine was designed to test whether deferral to a
48
finalized arbitration award is proper. In CollyerInsulated Wire Co. ,49
41. In Associated Press v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 662, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1974), Judge Skelly
Wright, writing for a unanimous court, stated: "We think it clear that submission to
grievance and arbitration proceedings of disputes which might involve unfair labor practices would be substantially discouraged if the disputants thought the Board would give de
novo consideration to the issue which the arbitrator might resolve."
42. See, e.g., Simon-Rose, supra note 14, at 211-13.
43. National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 532, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718, 1723 (1972), overruled in General Am. Transp. Corp., 94 L.R.R.M. 1483 (1977). In GeneralAm. Transp.
Corp., the Board stated: "The reduction in our workload is insignificant, and the sacrifice
of statutory protection is substantial." 94 L.R.R.M. at 1486. This is the same rationale
that the dissent in National Radio put forth against the caseload argument. See National
Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. at 535-56, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1727 (Members Fanning and Jenkins,
dissenting).
44. Associated Press v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 662, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See generally
Comment, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 YALE L.J. 1191, 1192 (1968).
45. Siegel, NLRB Deferralto Arbitrationin UnfairLaborPractices,26 N.Y.U. CONF.
ON LAB. 19, 31 (1973) ("I have recently had the occasion. . . to research every Supreme
Court comment on Spielberg. I have yet to find an adverse Supreme Court comment on
Spielberg."). See also Simon-Rose, supra note 14, at 216.
46. See generally Electrical Workers Local 715 v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 1136, 1137-38 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) for an illustration of the breadth with which courts have interpreted the
Spielberg doctrine.
47. Stephenson v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 535, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1977). The Stephenson majority merely criticized the unjustified extension of the Spielberg doctrine by cases such as
Electronic Reproduction (discussed at notes 71-89 infra and accompanying text). The
Stephenson court did not disapprove of Spielberg's basic elements.
48. Note, Alexander v. Gardner-Denverand Deferralto Labor Arbitrarion, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 408 (1975).
49. 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
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the deferral concept was expanded to include the requirement that parties
involved in disputes utilize contractually agreed upon methods of arbitration prior to seeking Board review. Importantly, the Board will retain

jurisdiction over the matter
solely for the purpose of entertaining an appropriate and timely

motion for further consideration upon a proper showing that either
(a) the dispute has not, with reasonable promptness after the issuance of this decision, either been resolved by amicable settlement
in the grievance procedure or submitted promptly to arbitration, or

(b) the grievance or arbitration procedures have not been fair and

regular or have reached a result which is repugnant to the [LMRA].50

The decision in Collyer relied upon the same policy considerations
underlying the Spielberg formula, to wit, encouraging "the voluntary
resolution by parties of their disputes . . . through their own agreed-

upon methods.'

5

The Collyer doctrine has been discussed favorably by

the United States Supreme Court, 52 and according to a Second Circuit

Court of Appeals opinion, "The validity of the Collyer doctrine is no
longer seriously in doubt." 53 Notwithstanding the general acceptance of
Collyer, two members of the NLRB continually dissent in cases affirming the doctrine. 54 However, the impact of these dissents on other Board
55
members and on courts confronted with the issue has been negligible.
C. The Development of DeferralPolicies:Prelude to Abdication?
During the twenty years following Spielberg the Board and reviewing
courts approved a steady expansion of the deferral doctrine into sensitive
areas of the Board's jurisdiction.56 The first expansion of the Spielberg
50. Id. at 843, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1938.
51. Id. at 843-44, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1938.
52. William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Council of Jacksonville, 417 U.S. 12, 16
(1974).
53. Lodge 700, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 525 F.2d 237, 239 (2d Cir. 1975).
54. See, e.g., McLean Trucking Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 710, 712, 82 L.R.R.M. 1652, 1654
(1973) (Members Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting).
55. In General Am. Transp. Corp., 94 L.R.R.M. 1483 (1977), Members Fanning and
Jenkins authored a plurality opinion which expressed their opposition to Collyer. Chairman Murphy (concurring, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1486) points out that such a holding was wholly
unnecessary to a resolution of the issue before the Board.
56. The expansion received its impetus during the 1960s. See, e.g., Local 1522, Int'l
Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 180 N.L.R.B. 131, 73 L.R.R.M. 1091 (1969); International
Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 51 L.R.R.M. 1155 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Ramsey v.
NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964). However, the expansion did not reach its full proportions until the 1970s with such decisions as Electronic
Reproduction Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211 (1974), and National
Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718 (1972).
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doctrine came in InternationalHarvester Co. 57 where the Board stated
that it would "voluntarily withhold" its authority to adjudicate statutory
unfair labor claims that arose from the same arbitrated contractual claims
"unless it clearly appears that the arbitration proceedings were tainted by
fraud, collusion, unfairness, serious procedural irregularities, or that the
award was clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act." 5 8
The arbitrator's findings on law and fact would stand unless "palpably
wrong," 5 9 and the Board was free to adopt the arbitral award as a
complete remedy. 6° Soon after International Harvester, Local 1522,
InternationalBrotherhoodof Electrical Workers6 1 followed with a similar fact situation and added the factor that new information raised in the
unfair labor practice hearing may not be sufficient reason itself to ignore
62
the previously rendered arbitration award.
In National Radio Co. ,63 a recently overruled extension of Collyer,
the Board tried to extend the deferral doctrine to cases where the applicable questions of contract and statutory protections were not necessarily
co-extensive. 64 While the Board appeared to appreciate the impact that
deference to unrelated statutory considerations could have, it justified the
policy as being in the best interests of a quick and fair vindication of
employee rights. 65 In the context of the case, the Board refused to equate
57. 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 51 L.R.R.M. 1155 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327
F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
58. Id. at 927, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1157. The Board, by this policy, varied the language of
Spielberg. See Comment, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 YALE L.J. 1191,
1192 (1968), suggesting that this was a drastic extention, rather than a mere variance, of
the Spielberg doctrine.
59. 138 N.L.R.B. at 928-29, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1158. But cf. Comment, The NLRB and
Deference to Arbitration,77 YALE L.J. 1191, 1206 (1968) (arguing that this policy was a
"remarkable misdelegation of authority").
60. See, e.g., Local 715, Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 1136, 1138
(D.C. Cir. 1974). See also Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082, 36 L.R.R.M.
1152, 1153 (1955).
61. 180 N.L.R.B. 131, 73 L.R.R.M. 1091 (1969).
62. Id. at 132, 136-37, 73 L.R.R.M. at 1091-92.
63. 198 N.L.R.B. 528, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718 (1972), overruled in General Am. Transp.
Corp., 94 L.R.R.M. 1483 (1977).
64. The majority realized that whereas in Collyer the statutory and contractual issues
were sufficiently intertwined, this was not necessarily the case in National Radio. For
this reason, the court felt it must be especially cautious since "a contractually sound and
entirely proper arbitration award might fail to dispose of all issues arising under the Act."
198 N.L.R.B. at 530, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1721.
65. Id. at 530-31, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1722. In addition, the majority stated that "[tlhe
intervention of this Board, by contrast, can sometimes be an unsettling force." Id. at 532,
80 L.R.R.M. at 1723. The dissent in NationalRadio reacted sharply to this argument that
Board intervention creates instability by stating:
[I]f the statutory protection is to be meaningful, of course Board decisions finding
unlawful conduct may be "unsettling" to the parties who have agreed to an arbitration provision . .

.

.The significance of the "unsettling effect" of a Board decision
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abstention with abdication.
The dissenting Board members in National Radio did not share the
majority's enthusiasm for abstention. They strongly cautioned against
such broad "subcontracting" of public authority to private tribunals,67
and questioned the arbitrator's competence in deciding the tough statutory questions with the same degree of protection that the Board could
guarantee under the NLRA. 68 As in InternationalHarvester,the dissenting members believed that such deferral discourages uniformity. 69 In
addition, Member Jenkins suggested that a liberal deferral policy sacrifices the individual's right of a comprehensive Board review to the
70
interests of efficiency through arbitration.
The expansion of the deferral doctrine was evident in a 1974 case,
Electronic Reproduction Service Corp.71 This case was a formidable
obstacle to the Ninth Circuit's attempt in Stephenson to define more
clearly the limits of the deferral doctrine. In ElectronicReproduction,
against the weight of previous Board opinions on point, 72 the NLRB
is simply that the protection of statutory rights often requires more than an arbitrator
is empowered to decide, or will award.
Id. at 535, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1726-27.
66. Id. at 531, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1722.
67. Id. at 533, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1724 (Members Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting). The
dissent reasoned: "To compel the victim of this alleged discrimination to resort to
arbitration is not 'deferral,' but a subcontracting to a private tribunal of the determination
of rights conferred and guaranteed solely by the statute. Such action mocks the statute
and the reason for this Board's existence."Id.
68. In comparing an arbitrator's ability to resolve a statutory issue with the Board's
ability to approach the same issue, the dissenting opinion of Members Fanning and
Jenkins stated:
The special competence of arbitrators in contract disputes, which is the only
substantive justification the Supreme Court has found for ordering the contracting
parties to arbitrate rather than litigate, does not exist in the field of statutory rights.
The arbitration process cannot use the Board's investigative or legal resources and
capabilities, and arbitrators do not have the expertise in statutory issues which the
Board has necessarily acquired through long, intimate, and specialized experience.
Id. at 533, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1725.
69. Id. ("Uniformity disappears, the preemption doctrine is frustrated, private tribunals proliferate with no real prospect of review of their actions, and anarchy begins to
intrude."). See also Collyer Insulated Wire Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 855, 77 L.R.R.M.
1931, 1949 (1971) (Member Jenkins, dissenting) ("It disposes only of the individual case,
rather than settling a principle.").
70. Collyer Insulated Wire Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 855, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1949 (1971)
(Member Jenkins, dissenting). See Pye, Collyer's Effect on the IndividualChargingParty,
25 LAB. L.J. 561, 569 (1974); Siber, The Gardner-DenverDecision:Does It Put Arbitration
In a Bind?, 25 LAB. L.J. 708, 713 (1974). See also Member Fanning's dissent in National
Radio in which he stated: "The 'therapy of arbitration' which the majority illogically
imports into this case leaves the patient to die without benefit of the protection Congress
intended him to have." 198 N.L.R.B. at 534, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1726 (footnote omitted).
71. 213 N.L.R.B. 758, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211 (1974).
72. See, e.g., John Klann Moving Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 1207, 67 L.R.R.M. 1585 (1968),
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handed down its broadest and most controversial decision on the deferral
policy to date-a policy which was flatly rejected in Stephenson." The
Board in ElectronicReproduction held that when the Board defers to an
arbitration award, it will be presumed that the arbitrator has adequately
determined all related unfair labor practice claims unless "unusual circumstances are shown which demonstrate that there were bona fide
reasons

. . .

which caused the failure to introduce such evidence at the

arbitration proceeding." 74 The Board held that this presumption not only
applies to evidence that was actually presented on the unfair labor
practices claim, but also to other evidence which the parties had an
opportunity to present, but did not.75 In effect, the ElectronicReproduction decision gave birth to an estoppel policy 76 in an attempt to force the
enforced, 411 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1969); D.C. Int'l, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 1383, 64 L.R.R.M.
1177, rev'd on other grounds, 385 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1967). In D.C. Int'l, the Board, in
refusing to defer to the arbitrator's decision, found that the issue of an unjustified
discharge was never raised directly or by inference, much less litigated before the committee. In John Klann, the Board also concluded that the arbitrator's award should not be
given controlling weight because the arbitration committee was never presented with, nor
did it, sua sponte, consider the question of whether the reasons advanced by the respondent for the discharge were specious.
73. Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d at 541.
74. 213 N.L.R.B. at 762, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1216. Accord, United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960) ("A mere ambiguity in the opinion
accompanying an award. . . is not reason for refusing to enforce the award."); Terminal
Transp. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 672, 673, 75 L.R.R.M. 1130, 1132 (1970) ("Nor is there reason
to disturb the award because the grievance committee, in its decision, made no findings
and did not mention the nature of the grievance."). Contra, Local 715, Int'l Bhd. of
Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 1136, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("In fact, this reasoning appears to contradict the Board's own decisions to the effect that deferral is not
appropriate with respect. to an issue not considered by'the arbitration panel."). See also
Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 884-85, 52 L.R.R.M. 1129, 1130 (1963), rev'd on other

grounds, 362 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964); Monsanto Chem. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1099,47
L.R.R.M. 1451, 1452 (1961). The Board in Monsanto stated: "It manifestly could not
encourage the voluntary settlement of disputes or effectuate the policies or purposes of
the Act to give binding effect in an unfair labor practice proceeding to an arbitration award
which does not purport to resolve. . .[that] issue." Id.
75. 213 N.L.R.B. at 761-62, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1215-16. The majority in ElectronicReproduction likened the practice of purposefully withholding evidence as "furthering the very
multiple litigation which Spielberg and Collyer were designed to discourage." The Board
distinguished the Monsanto and Raytheon decisions by finding that in those cases, where
deferral was not deemed to be proper, the arbitrator had decided not to decide the
statutory issues at all, and had made that intent fairly clear. See also Hawaiian Hauling
Serv., Ltd. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 674, 675 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2921 (1977).
76. See Filmation Assocs., Inc., 94 L.R.R.M. 1470 (1977) (Members Penello and Walther, dissenting). "Moreover,'like the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel...
Spielberg is intended to promote economy of litigation. A party having had the opportunity fairly to litigate an issue in one forum and lost ought not be permitted to try the same
issue in another forum." Id. at 1473 (citations omitted). Accord, Timken Roller Bearing
Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 501, 18 L.R.R.M. 1370, 1371 (1946), rev'd on othergrounds, 161
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parties to plead and prove all their unfair labor practice contentions in the
initial arbitration proceedings.7 7 If they did not so disclose, they could
face exclusion of that evidence in later Board action. The reason for
prohibiting a party "two bites of the apple ' 78 is grounded in the inefficiency of dual litigation.7 9 It is upon that theoretical basis that Electronic
Reproduction was decided.
By allowing deference on a hazy record below, and by presuming that

the arbitrator had considered the statutory issues inherent in the unfair
labor practice charges, the Electronic Reproduction decision directly
confronted and overruled two earlier Board decisions. 8" In Airco Industrial Gases,8 1 the Board had determined that deference would not be
accorded to the result of an arbitration proceeding where the issue sought
to be given deference had not been presented to the arbitral forum. In
F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947). Cf. Cohen & Eaby, The Gardner-DenverDecision and Labor
Arbitration, 27 LAB. L.J. 18, 21 (1976) (deferral discussed in the context of Title VII
questions); Johannesen & Smith, Collyer: Open Sesame to Deferral, 23 LAB. L.J. 723,741
(1972) (describing this doctrine of dual litigation in "double jeopardy" terms). Contra,
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974). In accord with the dissenting
opinion in Electronic Reproduction, the majority in Gardner-Denver stated that the
protections given under the controlling act cannot be waived. There can be no waiver
"since waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional purpose." Id.
77. The majority stated that:
Instead [of a quick and fair means of dispute resolution], such an artificial separation
of the issues seems likely to lead, as it did herein, to piecemeal litigation in which a
party may well prefer to have "two bites of the apple," trying part of the discharge
case before the arbitrator, but holding back evidence material to its claim so as to be
able to pursue the matter in yet another proceeding before this Board.
213 N.L.R.B. at 761, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1215. For viable answers to the argument that de
novo review by the Board gives a party "two bites of the apple," see Coulson, Title Seven
Arbitration in Action, 27 LAB. L.J. 141, 145 (1976) (arguing for a "waiver" solution to the
problems caused by dual litigation). Accord, Cohen & Eaby, The Gardner-DenverDecision and Labor Arbitration, 27 LAB. L.J. 18, 21 (1976).

78. Variations on the term "two bites of the apple" include dual or multiple litigation,
and double jeopardy. See generally Electronic Reproduction Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. at
761, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1215.
79. Despite this inefficiency, the issue is whether Congress intended to permit dual litigation. If so, only congressional mandate can remedy any wasteful practices the legislators have instituted. Several commentators on this dual litigation theory believe that Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974) severely deflated its rationale. In GardnerDenver, the Supreme Court concluded that even though arbitration was "final and
binding" on the employer and the union, in bringing an action under the statute "the
employee is not seeking review of the arbitrator's decision. Rather, he is asserting a
statutory right independent of the arbitration process." Id. at 54. See Siber, The GardnerDenver Decision: Does it Put Arbitrationin a Bind?, 25 LAB. L.J. 708, 717 (1974).
80. The Board's rationales in Airco Indus. Gases, 195 N.L.R.B. 676, 79 L.R.R.M.
1467 (1972) and Yourga Trucking, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 928, 80 L.R.R.M. 1498 (1972) may
still be viable in the wake of Banyard's and Stephenson's support of the basic tenets upon
which those "overruled" cases rest. See Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir.
1977).

81. 195 N.L.R.B. 676, 79 L.R.R.M. 1467 (1972).
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Yourga Trucking, Inc. ,82 the Board held that the party asserting that the

NLRB should give controlling effect (defer) to an arbitration award has
the burden of demonstrating that the statutory issue had been presented in
the arbitration proceedings."3 Electronic Reproduction shifted this burden onto the party claiming the issue had not or could not have been

decided in arbitration under its "presumption" rationale.
Reiterating the belief stated in NationalRadio that discharge cases are
best decided by arbitrators since contract issues are difficult to separate
from statutory claims, the majority in Electronic Reproduction, by
overruling the Airco and Yourga precedents, drastically narrowed the

number of unfair labor practices cases in which jurisdiction by the Board
could be asserted. 8 4 In the interest of preventing piecemeal litigation, and
to discourage forum shopping, the Board in Electronic Reproduction
decided to allow an arbitrator's decision "to stand in the absence of
procedural irregularity or statutory repugnancy.' '85
The dissent in Electronic Reproduction was clearly upset by the
broadening of the power' of the Board to defer even statutory issues to

arbitration. 86 Cognizant that the broad contours of the deferral doctrine
encourages non-review, the dissent in Electronic Reproduction warned
82. 197 N.L.R.B. 928, 80 L.R.R.M. 1498 (1972).
83. Specifically, the Board in Yourga stated:
We hold that the burden to adduce such proof rests on the party asserting that our
statutory jurisdiction to resolve the issue of discrimination should not be exercised.
That party may be presumed to have the strongest interest in establishing that the
issue has been previously litigated, if that is the case.
Id. at 928, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1499 (emphasis added).
84. The majority ruled that "except in unusual circumstances, under which it is not
reasonable to expect or require full litigation of these issues in the grievance and arbitration process," the Board would defer to the arbitration award. 213 N.L.R.B. at 761, 87
L.R.R.M. at 1215. See also Simon-Rose, supra note 14, at 211.
85. 213 N.L.R.B. at 761, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1215. Contra, Gulf States Asphalt Co., 200
N.L.R.B. 938, 82 L.R.R.M. 1008 (1972) (Members Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting). The
dissent in Gulf States Asphalt reasoned:
[The majority is] willing to presume that the arbitrator must have disposed of the
unfair labor practice issue because it was presented to him. The difficulty with this
approach is twofold. First, the presumption they apply not only places the burden on
the General Counsel to prove that an arbitrator did not dispose of the statutory
violation but to do so by proving a negative, an almost impossible task. . . . If a
presumption is to be applied, it is one that places the burden upon the alleged violator
of the statute to prove that the arbitrator's award did in truth dispose of both the
statutory and contract violations . ...
Id. at 941, 82 L.R.R.M. at 1011.
86. 213 N.L.R.B. at 765i 87 L.R.R.M. at 1219-20. In particular the dissenting members
in Electronic Reproduction felt that the rationale of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36 (1974) should be extended to labor relations and unfair labor practices cases as
well as to Title VII questions. Citing Gardner-Denver,the dissent contended that arbitration vindicates only the
"contractual right under a collective-bargaining agreement," and not the "indepen-
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that the NLRA could be easily circumvented by union-employer

"sweetheart" agreements which contracted the parties out of the Act by

insertion of arbitration clauses. 87 In short, to allow arbitrators with little

or no expertise in interpreting the Act to vindicate public rights by private
methods of resolution is to deny the equal protection and uniform application of the NLRA as mandated by Congress and the courts.8 8 To the

dissent, Spielberg's delicate balance had been lost.8 9
D. The Alexander-Banyard Limitation: Competence and Clarity
The Stephenson court relied heavily upon the Supreme Court's narrow
guidelines for administrative deferral enunciated in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. I and the District of Columbia Circuit's deferral policy
dent statutory rights accorded by Congress." The distinctly separate nature of these
contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a
result of the same factual occurrence. And certainly no inconsistency results from
permitting both rights to be enforced in their respectively appropriate forums.
213 N.L.R.B. at 766, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1220 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 49-50 (1974)). See also Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons, 199 N.L.R.B. 461, 464-66, 81
L.R.R.M. 1261, 1266-67 (1972).
87. 213 N.L.R.B. at 765, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1219. The dissent added that "it also means
that the stronger party can compel the weaker to abandon the protection of the Act
through insistence on an arbitration clause .

. . ."

Id. See also Tyee Constr. Co., 202

N.L.R.B. 307, 82 L.R.R.M. 1548 (1973) (Members Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting). The
dissent reasoned:
The result is that the union and employer can escape the Board's and courts'
application of the Act to their violations of it by simply including in their contract a
provision, as here, which contains language similar to that of the Act and attaching an
arbitration clause. Statutory rights are then reduced to contract rights and will disappear.

...

Id. at 310, 82 L.R.R.M. at 1552 (citing Terminal Transp. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 672, 75
L.R.R.M. 1130 (1970)).
88. 213 N.L.R.B. at 765, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1219.
Arbitration is essentially alien to determination of public rights. Arbitrators have no
expertise in the interpretation of the Act. The Board does.
However desirable and fruitful may be the arbitration of private rights, the reasoning is not transferrable [sic] to public rights. As we have previously observed, public
rights cannot be the "plaything of private treaty."
Id. See also Comment, Collyer Insulated Wire, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 236, 253 (1972).
89. 213 N.L.R.B. at 765, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1219. The dissent stated: "We continue to
think that Congress meant that statutory violations should be found if they exist, and
remedied if found, and by this Board to which Congress entrusted the responsibility." In
essence, the dissent believed that the Board's jurisdiction is not intended to be merely one
means of orderly resolution of industrial disputes, but the means of resolution. Id. at 763,
87 L.R.R.M. at 1217. The "slippery slope" of broad deferral, predicted Members Fanning
and Jenkins, could have "no stopping point short of the bottom." Id. at 765, 87 L.R.R.M.
at 1219.
90. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). In Gardner-Denver,the Supreme Court held that an employee
retains his right to a trial de novo under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, even
though he has previously submitted his claim to final and binding arbitration.
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announced in Banyard v. NLRB.91 These cases were decided soon after
ElectronicReproduction and represent a cautionary stance which many
courts have taken in an effort to slow the ever-widening scope of

deferral.
The applicability of the limitations to deferral imposed in Gardner92
Denver to areas other than Title VII questions is a point of contention.
Nevertheless, certain general statements as to the wisdom of broad
deferral policies can be analogized to related NLRB questions. 93 The
Supreme Court stated that in certain areas of competence, it is improper
for an administrative board to defer to arbitral decisions without the full
de novo review mandated by the governing statute. 94 The Supreme Court
deemed it unwise to use deferral policies to vest decisional power in
another body when that power was already expressly given to the Board
or court in question. 95 Referring to the earlier decision of Rios v.

Reynolds Metals Co. ,96 the Gardner-Denvermajority felt that deferral
of tough statutory questions to an arbitration procedure makes that
method of dispute resolution lengthy, costly, complicated, and legalis98
tic,' 7 precisely what arbitration was intended not to be.
91. 505 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
92. The dissenting opinion in Electronic Reproduction Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758,
766-69, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211, 1222-23 (1974) forcefully argued that Gardner-Denverhas
application outside the area of Title VII questions. Accord, Amalgamated Ass'n of St.
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 286-87 (1971), in which the Supreme Court
referred to unfair labor practice issues in the Gardner-Denverdecision. But cf. Nash,
Board Referral to Arbitration and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,25 LAB. L.J. 259, 269
(1974) (taking position that Gardner-Denverdecision will have little, if any, impact upon
Collyer and Spielberg policies, or their development).
93. Certainly the Supreme Court was aware of the effect that Gardner-Denverwould
have on similar deferral policies outside the scope of Title VII questions. See Electronic
Reproduction Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758, 766-67, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211, 1220-21 (1974)
(Members Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting).
94. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 48. In effect, the Supreme Court
held that the doctrine of election of remedies is not applicable to Title VII claims: "The
distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely
because both were violated as a result of the same factual occurrence. . . . [T]he
relationship between the forums is complementary . .

.

.Thus the rationale behind the

election-of-remedies doctrine cannot support the decision ....
Id. at 50-51.
95. Id. at 56.
96. 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Hill, The Effects of Non-Deference on the
ArbitralInstitution, 28 LAB. L.J. 230,232,237 (1977), for a discussion of the Rios criteria.
97. 415 U.S. at 58-59.
98. See Newman, NLRB Deferralto Arbitration in UnfairLaborPractices,26 N.Y.U.
CONF. ON LAB. 37, 40 (1973) [hereinafter cited as NLRB Deferralto Arbitration],in which
the author states:
The whole concept of arbitration has become so distorted by this whole thing and
by the Board approach of what arbitration is today. Arbitration started out. . . many
years ago as an informal, quick, cheap way of settling disputes. It now has become, in

1977]

RECENT NINTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS

The Banyard decision agreed with the basic rationale of GardnerDenver. The Banyard court, while approving the three-pronged test

derived from Spielberg, explicitly rejected Electronic Reproduction's
allowance of deferral when the unfair labor practices issue had not been
clearly decided by the arbitral panel, or when the competency of the
arbitral panel to decide such important questions was not proved. 99 By
adding these two additional requirements to the Spielberg test, the

Banyard majority took a sizeable step away from the Electronic Reproduction decision towards a more moderate position on the question of
deferral, and thereby set the stage for similar moves by the Ninth

Circuit. 01'

E. The Ninth Circuit: In Banyard's Wake
Since 1974 the Ninth Circuit has rendered several opinions dealing
with the scope of the Board's deferral policies, culminating with
Stephenson in 1977.101 In the Provision House Workers Local 274

v. NLRB"° decision, the court reaffirmed the basic right of the Board to

defer to an arbitration award, but also added a liberal tone to its decision,

possibly affected by the impact of the broad trend set by Electronic
Reproduction, by allowing deferral even when the initial award was not
free from doubt as to the basis for the decision.1 3 Soon thereafter the
Ninth Circuit retreated from its liberal position in NLRB v. International
general, a very formal, time-consuming, expensive way of settling disputes ....
Id.
99. 505 F.2d at 348. The administrative law judge in Banyard had determined that
deferral was not appropriate since the issue raised was not within the arbitrator's special
competence. McLean Trucking Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 710, 721 (1973).
As for the clarity requirement, see Superior Motor Transp. Co., 200 N.L.R.B. 892, 896,
82 L.R.R.M. 1083, 1085 (1975). However, it is yet unspecified whether the "clearly
decided" test refers to the written decision or matters actually heard. See also SimonRose, supra note 14, at 215.
100. The line of authority initiated by the majority in McLean Trucking Co. was
followed by the Ninth Circuit less than one year later in Provision House Workers Union
y. NLRB, 493 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 828 (1974).
101. Four opinions on the deferral issue were handed down in three years. See Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977); Hawaiian Hauling Serv., Ltd. v. NLRB, 545
F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2921 (1977); NLRB v. International
Longshoremen's Local 27, 514 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1975); Provision House Workers Local
274 v. NLRB, 493 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 828 (1974).
102. 493 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 828 (1974).
103. Id. at 1249. However, with the same breath, the court stated that "of course, the
Board cannot abdicate its statutory responsibility by inappropriate deferrals to arbitration." See also International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 530 F.2d 849, 850 (9th Cir.
1976).
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Longshoremen's Local 271° where the court held that it was not an
abuse of discretion for the NLRB to decline to defer to an arbitration
05
award that did not clearly resolve issues of the unfair labor charge.'
Clearly such language was at odds with the "presumption" language of
Electronic Reproduction. The initial assault upon Electronic Reproduction's liberalized deferral policies within the Ninth Circuit had thereby
been launched.
The decision in Stephenson, therefore, followed logically from the
International Longshoremen decision and the earlier lead set by Banyard in the District of Columbia Circuit. The Stephenson majority echoed
the previously expressed distaste for the Electronic Reproduction decision that had been stated in Banyard.1° 6 While noting the Board's
laudable intent, 107 the Ninth Circuit felt that "the Board's method constitutes an unjustifiable extension of its deferral policy."108 While acknowledging that the function of an arbitrator is to resolve disputes, the court
noted that the arbitrator's domain of competence must nonetheless be
limited to areas of contractual dispute and should not encroach upon the
NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practices as mandated by
section 10 of its enabling legislation. °0 The Board cannot abdicate its
duty to consider unfair labor charges by deferring to an arbitration
decision when there is no lawful basis for doing so. 10° The legislative
history of section 10 suggests that arbitration is not intended as a substitute for Board action, since arbitrators are not bound to apply the Board's
and the courts' definitions of standards to be enforced under the
104. 514 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1975). Accord, Hawaiian Hauling Serv., Ltd. v. NLRB, 545
F.2d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2921 (1977), in which the Ninth Circuit
refused to defer to an arbitration award when the award was not in compliance with Board
standards. The court stated that unless the Board clearly departs from its standards, or its
standards are themselves invalid, the Board has the right to review arbitration decisions.
105. 514 F.2d at 483.

106. Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 538-39, 541 (9th Cir. 1977). For other criticism,-see Simon-Rose, supra note 14, at 209-12.
107. 550 F.2d at 539. See also Johannesen & Smith, Collyer: Open Sesame to Deferral,
23 LAB. L.J. 723, 741 (1972).
108. 550 F.2d at 539.
109. Id. See note 1 supra. The court stated that this encroachment is precisely what the
ElectronicReproduction decision had fostered. See Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co.,
147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964) (Member Brown, concurring) in which Member Brown stated:
In the United States, the function of the arbitrator rarely exceeds interpretation and
application of a particular provision of an existing agreement to a particular dispute.
The arbitrator is limited to the enforcement of existing rights, and where the parties
have not yet reached agreement the arbitrator ordinarily has no power to act. Thus,
we may characterize arbitrationas retrospective in nature, that is, concerned with
interpretingexisting agreements.
Id. at 1422 (emphasis added).
110. 550 F.2d at 539.
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Rather, arbitrators are expected to serve the immediate needs
12

of the private parties who employ them.

Applying the five-pronged' 3 Banyard test, the Stephenson court
found the arbitrator's decision inadequate." 4 The record was bare as to
what was decided in arbitration, thus failing to meet the "clearly de-

cided" criterion of Banyard.115 The majority stated that application of
the presumption theory of Electronic Reproduction would penalize
Stephenson despite the ambiguity in the record, a result inconsistent with
the policies of the Act.'6 Deferral is improper when the Board is ignorant

of the basis for such deferral." 7 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit remanded
the case to the Board for consideration of the unfair labor practice

issue."1 "

The dissent by Judge Kunzig argued against restricting the scope of the

Board's discretion by incorporating the additional Banyard requirements

of competence and clarity."I9 The judge feared that the decision would

allow the parties to hold back key evidence at the arbitration stage in
I 11. Id. at 540. As the Court stated in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974):
[Tihe arbitrator's task is to effectuate the intent of the parties. His source of authority
is the collective-bargaining agreement, and he must interpret and apply that agreement
in accordance with the "industrial common law of the shop" and the various needs
and desires of the parties. The arbitrator, however, has no general authority to invoke
public laws that conflict with the bargain between the parties.
Id. at 53.
112. 550 F.2d at 540. See Bloch, The NLRB and Arbitration:Is the Board'sExpanding
JurisdictionJustified?, 19 LAB. L.J. 640 (1968):
An arbitrator, on the other hand, determines "private rights and private duties
stemming from a private contract." He is an employee of the parties and must reach a
conclusion satisfactory to both sides, lest (1) industrial strife remain and (2) he find
himself unemployed during future disputes. His function is limited. It is generally
admitted that he need interpret only the contract itself, and question only whether the
terms agreed upon were obeyed. It is not his concern if performance according to the
terms would constitute outright unfair labor practices; this is the Board's problem.
Id. at 642-43. See also Casenote, Banyard v. NLRB, 88 HARV. L. REv. 804, 808 (1975) for
the additional argument that arbitrators are not bound to apply or enforce rights under the
NLRA.
113. 550 F.2d at 538. The Banyard modification of the Spielberg test can be found at
505 F.2d at 347. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
114. 550 F.2d at 538-39.
115. Id. at 540-41. For an analysis of the "clearly decided" requirement, see id. at 538
n.4.
116. Id. at 541.
117. It has been suggested that deference based upon ignorance of what the arbitrator
decided will only lead to "contractual chaos." Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 94 L.R.R.M.
1474, 1482 (1977) (Members Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting).
118. 550 F.2d at 541.
119. Id. at 542. Judge Kunzig, in dissent, stated: "There is no need to move into the
area of Banyard. To put more requirements on top of Spielberg may well make effective
use of the arbitration process extremely difficult. . . . I am seriously concerned with the
damage Banyard can do to the vitally important arbitration process." Id.
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order to seek de novo review by the Board in the event they should be
dissatisfied with the arbitration award-a variation of the "second bite of
the apple" theory. 12 0 The dissent predicted the serious crippling effect
such dual litigation might have on the effectiveness of arbitration. The
majority offered a sharp rebuke to this dual litigation argument so often
121
cited to support the exercise of broad deferral powers.
Despite the validity of many points raised by the dissent, it appears
that Stephenson goes a fair distance in reestablishing the discretionary
balance envisaged in Spielberg on deferral questions. 122 Although an
argument can be advanced for the general competency 'of arbitrators to
decide tough statutory questions, 23 an even stronger case has been set
forth by various authors as to the undesirability of requiring arbitrators to
be faced with such decisions.12 4 The heavy costs involved when arbitration is complicated by statutory questions is another critical factor sup120. Id. Judge Kunzig continued: "A plaintiff can hold back some of his material
issues, carefully preserve an important argument, and then (if he loses in arbitration) claim
the panel failed specifically to pass on this point and start all over again."
121. The majority in Stephenson responded with its own suggestion:
If [the Board] so desires it can utilize the Collyer case and its own power to decline
jurisdiction and withhold its consideration in cases where it is shown that the party
initiating the unfair labor practice proceeding has failed to present the unfair labor
practice issue or evidence to the arbitrator where such presentation is deemed necessary. By using Collyer, the Board's action is not made pursuant to unfounded
presumptions as to the basis of the arbitrator's award, but upon a recognition of the
propriety of the arbitration process itself.
Id. at 541 (citations omitted).
122. It certainly retreats from the position taken in ElectronicReproductionby making
it clear that deferral is not merely a rubber stamp to an arbitrator's decision or a way to
reduce the Board's caseload.
123. Dworkin, How Arbitrators Decide Cases, 25 LAB. L.J. 200, 201 (1974); Witney,
The Right Conclusionfor the Wrong Reasons: A Rejoinderto Belkin, 25 LAB. L.J. 114, 115

(1974). In the Witney article the author stated: "[T]he lack of formal legal training does
not necessarily mean an arbitrator does not understand the law and NLRB precedents."
Continuing, Witney criticizes those who think of arbitrators in "box score terms":
If Belkin understands the arbitration process, he would know that the fastest way to
oblivion is for an arbitrator to do what he [Belkin] says arbitrators do. As a matter of
fact, many professional arbitrators have so many cases that they are pleased when
cases are withdrawn from arbitration. .

.

. Clearly, if the parties believed that arbit-

rators compromise their integrity, they would not refer more and more cases each
year to arbitration.

Id. at 115. See Siegel, NLRB Deferral to Arbitration in Unfair Labor Practices, 26
N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 19, 24 (1973). See also Samoff, Arbitration, Not NLRB Intervention, 18 LAB. L.J. 602, 630 (1967).
124. The various ways in which arbitrators are claimed to be incapable of handling
statutory issues have been discussed by the commentators. See, e.g., Belkin, Are Arbitrators Qualified to Decide Unfair Labor PracticeCases?, 24 LAB. L.J. 818, 818 (1973);
Christensen, LaborArbitrationand JudicialOversight, 19 STAN. L. REV. 671,676 (1967);
Coulson, Title Seven Arbitration in Action, 27 LAB. L.J. 141, 147 (1976); Siber, The
Gardner-DenverDecision:Does it Put Arbitrationin a Bind?, 25 LAB. L.J. 708, 711 (1974);
Comment, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 YALE L.J. 1191, 1194-95 (1968).
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porting limited deferral policies.125 The primary advantage of arbitration,
that it provides a quick resolution of the dispute, may well be lost if
arbitration becomes more legalistic and less intuitive. 126 Finally, the lack

of resources available to an arbitrator to enforce the arbitration decision12 7 and the lack of uniformity in arbitrated cases provide persuasive
125. See National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718 (1972) (Members
Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting:
[T]he cost of arbitration will severely limit the protection of the discriminatees. Each
arbitration, as we have pointed out elsewhere, will cost well over $500 per side, with
the likelihood that the figure will exceed $1,000. Since arbitration settles only the
particular case arbitrated, and provides no remedy against future violations, a determined opponent of employee rights can repeat the unlawful conduct and make it
almost impossible for even a strong union to continue the arbitration course.
Id. at 535, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1726. Since National Radio, the figures have doubled. See
Zalusky, Arbitration: Updating a Vital Process, AFL-CIO AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST,
November, 1976, at 1, pointing out that the estimated cost per party of an arbitrated case
is now $2,290. The article attributes much of this increase to the fact that arbitration "is
taking on the appearance of a courtroom procedure." Accord, Simon-Rose, supra note
14, at 208 ("If costs become an overwhelming factor. . . the employees are necessarily
going to be short-changed."). See also NLRB Deferralto Arbitration, supra note 98, in
which the author reasons: "For example. . . an arbitrator is going to want to write a more
complete opinion. Well, if you are going to .have transcripts and if you are going to have
more complete opinions, then the parties have to pay for them. It will put arbitration that
much farther out of reach." Id. at 46.
126. 550 F.2d at 245. The thought that "arbitration is often a catalyst in labor peace
because of its speed" does not seem to be wholly true in light of arbitration practices
today. United Steelworkers v. American Int'l Aluminum Corp., 334 F.2d 147, 153 (5th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 991 (1965). See NLRB Deferralto Arbitration,supra note 98,
where the author states:
Also incredible is the fact that this is a time-saver for the Board. The regional office
will spend as much time as it previously did, at least as much time as it previously did
in determining whether or not the case should be deferred. . . . Therefore the same
investigation has to take place.
Id. at 41. He continues: "[A]ny time you have a majority and minority, they take three
times as long, at least for the Board to decide. . . . Certainly, up to now there has been no
cost saving. And I think anybody who justifies it [broad deferral] on that basis is throwing
in a makeweight." Id. at 42. Finally the author states: "In terms of speed again, it now
takes just about as long to get to an arbitration hearing as it does to get to a trial examiner's
decision, at least. . . in effect most Board proceedings are settled more quickly than they
are through grievance and arbitration procedure." Id. at 46. But cf. General Am. Transp.
Corp., 94 L.R.R.M. 1483, 1494 (1977) (Members Penello and Walther, dissenting) (citing
statistics from unpublished Board study of effect of Collyer over two and one-half year
period, and concluding that there is 50-50 chance of resolving disputes short of arbitration).
127. 550 F.2d at 539. See Coulson, Title Seven Arbitrationin Action, 27 LAB. L.J. 141
(1976):
A major problem is the difficulty of insuring real compliance. The arbitrator can
order a promotion or reinstate an employee, but he is rarely in the position to
determine what happens after the award has been submitted and his explicit instructions have been followed. .

.

. I have had the feeling

. . .

that I was sending the

employee back into the bear pit.
Id. at 150. But cf. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. Longshore Workers Local 1418, 389 F.2d
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FUTURE TRENDS, ARGUMENTS, AND CONCLUSIONS

It appears to this author, and others, 129 that the Banyard-Stephenson
line of reasoning provides the soundest alternative to present deferral
practices. 130 While the concept of deferral is valuable when that concept
includes adequate restraints, the Board's decisions in ElectronicReproduction and similar cases were undesirable extensions to the carefully
balanced Spielberg doctrine. The Stephenson decision provides the type
of reasoning needed to bring the deferral policy back to a moderate
position, and this appears to be the trend in recent months. 131 When the
Board defers statutory questions to the arbitral process, the Board has, in
effect, indirectly succeeded in making the arbitral forums "courts of
lesser jurisdiction" under the NLRA. 132 Those arbitrators unwilling or
369, 371-72 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 828 (1968) (allowing judicial enforcement
of an arbitration award containing a "cease and desist" order).
128. See Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274,287 (1971) ("A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or
conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law."); National Radio Co.,
198 N.L.R.B. 528, 533, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718, 1725 (1972) (Members Fanning and Jenkins,
dissenting) ("Uniformity disappears, the preemption doctrine is frustrated, private tribunals proliferate with no real prospect for review of their actions, and anarchy begins to
intrude."); Radioear Corp., 199 N.L.R.B. 1161, 1163, 81 L.R.R.M. 1402, 1404 (1971)
(Members Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting) ("The result will open the door to an erratic
lack of uniformity in areas in which legal principles rather than contract interpretation are
at issue."); Comment, Deferral to Labor Arbitration, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 410 (1975)
("Successive awards could produce a variety of ad hoc solutions to the same problem, all
consistent with the Act, but no uniform rule. In such circumstances further abstention by
the Board might be contrary to Federal labor policy."); see also Davey, Restructuring
Grievance ArbitrationProcedures, 54 IOWA L. REV. 560, 562 (1969) (citing as reason for
lack of uniformity fact that no uniform rules have been established among three major
arbitration associations).
129. See, e.g., Johannesen & Smith, Collyer: Open Sesame to Deferral, 23 LAB. L.J.
723, 741 (1972); Pye, Collyer's Effect on the Individual ChargingParty, 25 LAB. L.J. 561,
567 (1974); Siber, The Gardner-DenverDecision: Does it Put Arbitration in a Bind?, 25
LAB. L.J. 708, 717 (1974); Simon-Rose, supra note 14, at 211.
130. See Simon-Rose, supra note 14, at 214.
131. See General Am. Transp. Corp., 94 L.R.R.M. 1483 (1977) (Collyer doctrine
severely curtailed and NationalRadio decision, discussed in text accompanying note 63
supra, overruled); Filmation Assocs. Inc., 94 L.R.R.M. 1470, 1470 (1977) (Board refused
to extend Spielberg doctrine to unfair labor practices issues since those issues "are solely
within NLRB's province to decide," and "may not be delegated to the parties or to an
arbitrator"). But cf. Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 94 L.R.R.M. 1474 (1977) (decided same
day as GeneralAm. Transp. Corp. and giving continued support to Collyer doctrine).
132. Simon-Rose, supra note 14, at 212. See generally National Radio Co., 198
N.L.R.B. 528, 531, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718, 1723 (1972), for a discussion of how widespread
arbitration has become.

1977]

RECENT NINTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS

unable to resolve statutory issues are forced to do so nonetheless.I 3 "The
alternative, for the arbitrator, is to cease being an arbitrator."'134 Therefore, support for Stephenson should be found amongst arbitrators as
well. 135
Further support for placing limitations on deferral policies can be
found in arguments encountered earlier: the competence of arbitrators to
decide statutory problems; the statutory right to a fair determination of an
unfair labor practice claim; and the fact that section 203(d) of the Labor
Management Relations Act' 36 did not amend the NLRA so as to substitute arbitration as an alternative means for Board resolution of statutory
questions, but merely established the desirability of incorporating arbitration into the labor relations environment.137 As Board Members Fanning
and Jenkins recognized, "The grant of authority from Congress to the
NLRB in unfair labor practice cases simply does not give the Board the
38
discretionary authority to subdelegate its power to private parties."1
While the influence of the policy justifications of ElectronicReproduction appears to be lessening in the reviewing circuit courts, the exact
direction the Board will take on the scope of the deferral doctrine is still
in doubt. But it is certain, in light of the court's argument in Stephenson,
that the Board now appreciates the potential penalties that decisions such
as Electronic Reproduction might impose in persuading the parties to
39
arbitrate and settle their disputes in lieu of Board action. 1
With the passage of the NLRA in 1935, Congress saw the need to
create an administrative body to enforce its labor statutes." After years
of experience, the Board has become expert in interpreting and giving
meaning to these statutes. By deferring its authority in cases such as
Electronic Reproduction to an arbitrator not vested with the power to
133. Simon-Rose, supra note 14, at 209, 212. See also Pye, Collyer's Effect on the
Individual ChargingParty, 25 LAB. L.J. 561, 567 (1974).

134. Casenote, Banyard v. NLRB, 88 HARV. L. REv. 804, 810 (1975).
135. Siegel, NLRB Deferral to Arbitration, 26 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 19, 35 (1973).
136. See note 29 supra.
137. See Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 886, 52 L.R.R.M. 1129, 1131 (1963). Accord, Simon-Rose, supra note 14, at 216 ("No construction of Section 203(d) supports the

proposition that the Board can employ the arbitration process as an additional forum for
the resolution of unfair labor practice charges.").
138. National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 528, 533, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718, 1725 (1972)
(Members Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting).
139. 550 F.2d at 541. Such potential penalties take the form of a presumption that

evidence on a statutory issue has been presented to the arbitrator, even when, in fact, the
evidence may not have been so presented. See Simon-Rose, supra note 14, at211-12, 215;
Comment, Collyer Insulated Wire, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 236, 254 (1972).
140. General Am. Transp. Corp., 94 L.R.R.M. 1483, 1484 (1977). See also Simon-Rose,

supra note 14, at 215.
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determine public rights, but instead concerned with the private rights of
the immediate parties, the Board repudiated the essential purposes and
policies underlying the NLRA. 4 The Banyard decision appears to have
reestablished a more circumscribed deferral policy which the Ninth
Circuit in Stephenson has adopted and refined. Together these cases
signal a reassertion of proper Board authority in the area of labormanagement relations.
Alan B. Rabkin*

141. See National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 528, 535, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718, 1726 (1972)
(Members Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting). See also NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S.
418, 424-25 (1968).
* The author wishes to express his appreciation to the Hon. August J. Goebel, Judge of
the Los Angeles Superior Court, for his comments and suggestions.

